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Over the past several years, both the National Basketball Association
(NBA) and the National Football League (NFL) have taken steps to expand
their footprint in Europe.'
In February 2008, after playing a limited number of exhibition games
in Europe during the 2006-07 and 2007-08 seasons, NBA Commissioner
David Stem announced plans to place up to five expansion franchises in
Europe within the next ten years. 2  Stem's plan called for a five-team
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1 See Doreen Carvajal, U.S. Leagues Race to Give up Home-Court Advantage, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 11, 2006, at 13, available at 2006 WLNR 21360133 ("[T]he NBA
brought four teams to Western Europe and Russia to play exhibition games."); Juan Jose
Mateo, Rumor Linking Real Madrid with NBA Causes Uproar at Club as Official Quits, EL
PAIS, Dec. 14, 2006, at 6, available at 2006 WLNR 21533147 (discussing possibility of
Spain's Real Madrid team being eventually invited to join the NBA); Stern: NBA Needs
More Money to Expand to Europe, SOtJTHTOWN STAR (Chicago, IL), Mar. 28, 2008, at B-2
(discussing NBA Commissioner Stem's interest in expanding the NBA into Europe). Cf
Doreen Carvajal, U.S. Leagues Race to Give up Home-Court Advantage, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Nov. 11, 2006, at 13, available at 2006 WLNR 21360133 ("NBA.com draws more
than 2.6 million daily visits, with more than half of the traffic coming from fans outside the
United States, according to league officials."); Powerlunch Europe 2007-10-26 11.13:11,
CNBC GENERAL PROGRAMMING, Oct. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 21209763
(discussing NFL regular season game in Europe as first step toward expansion overseas).
2 See Michael Hunt, Michael Hunt In My Opinion: In Need of Cultural Revitalization,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 15, 2008, at C 1; Stern: NBA Needs More Money to Expand to
Europe, SOUTHTOWN STAR (Chicago, IL), Mar. 28, 2008, at B-2 (NBA plans to place one
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European division, with new basketball franchises located in several
European Union (EU) Member States. 3
Meanwhile, on October 28, 2007, London's Wembley Stadium hosted
the first regular-season NFL game played overseas.4 According to NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell, the NFL is committed to play at least one
regular-season game in England during each of the next three seasons.5
The NFL has also indicated interest in playing games in Frankfurt,
Germany, where the league has long maintained an international office.6
From a marketing perspective, the expansion of U.S. ?rofessional
sports leagues into Europe opens up new revenue opportunities. However,
from a legal perspective, if either the NBA or NFL expands into EU
Member States, the league would expose itself to potential liability under
the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty). 8
team in Europe); Marc Tandan, Cubby Hole, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, VA), Feb. 18,
2008, at C2 (NBA plans to place "up to five teams" in Europe). Cf Terry Lefton, NBA Still
Doing Some Interesting Deals on Homefront Too, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS B. J., Oct. 29,
2007, at 14 ("After being continually pestered by those touting the NBA's declaration of
manifest destiny in both Europe and Asia, we felt the need to verify that there is still a
healthy domestic business for the league.").
3 NBA May Expand into Europe, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at 19, available at 2008
WLNR 2952981.
4 See David Picker, Keeping Things Normal for an Abnormal Event, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
2008, at D-3; see also Greg Bishop, It's a Scrimmage, Not a Scrum, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,
2007, at 42 ("The contest, the first regular-season National Football League game played
outside of North America, brings the American version of the sport full circle. If you trace
football back to its origins, you end up, well, in London."); John Branch, English Reserve
Meets N.F.L. Bombast, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2007, at D-1 ("To introduce the N.F.L.'s
overseas arrival, an on-field pregame show included a pop band, the white-booted and short-
shorted Dolphins cheerleaders, four dozen people twirling gigantic Dolphins and Giants
jerseys, and a circling blimp. Players were announced with fireworks and bursts of
flames."); Mark Hodgkinson, American Sports, American Excess. No Thanks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2007, § 8, at 10.
5 See John Branch, At 90, Giants Trainer Decides He Will Retire After Sunday's Game,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at D-4 ("The N.F.L. also has a three-year commitment to play at
least one game in Britain. The New Orleans Saints will play host to the San Diego Chargers
on Oct. 26 at Wembley Stadium in London. Goodell noted that many franchises were
interested in playing in this year's game.").
6 See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Limits Overseas Focus, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS B. J., Aug.
6, 2007, at 10 ("The NFL's much-hyped plans to play international regular-season games is
focused on two overseas locales: England and Germany."); Daniel Kaplan, NFL to Put
International Office in Frankfurt, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS B. J., Jan. 9, 2006, at 4
(accompanying chart).
7 See Ian Thomson, FIBA Not Thrilled About NBA 's Plan, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 25,
2002, at 75.
8 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 81,
2006 O.J. (C 321) 73 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; Joined Cases 89, 104, 116, 117, & 125-
129/85, A. Ahlstr6m Osakeyhti6 v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988), M 11-23
[hereinafter Re Wood Pulp Cartel]; see also ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC
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This article discusses the legal risks that would emerge if the NBA and
NFL decide to expand into Europe. Part I of this article explains the
differences in operating structure between U.S. and European professional
sports leagues. Part II discusses the differences in competition law between
the United States and European Community. Part III explains why the legal
status of age and education (age/education requirements) is more favorable
to professional sports leagues under U.S. law than under EC law. Part IV
explains why the legal status of league drafts and reserve systems also
might be more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
U.S. and European professional sports leagues are structured
differently from one another. 9 In the United States, sports leagues oPerate
under a closed-entry structure with a set number of clubs per league. 0 By
contrast, in Europe, sports leagues operate under a promotion-and-
relegation system that allows any prospective owner to form a club and
join.1" Because of these differences, sports economics literature often
refers to U.S. team owners as "profit-maximizing businessmen," while
referring to European team owners as "sportsmen."'
COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 1056 (2001) ("In Wood Pulp, therefore,
the Court confirmed that Article 81 could be applied extraterritorially."). The major thrust of
the extraterritorial scope of European competition law derives from the Re Wood Pulp Cartel
cases, in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that "by applying the competition
rules in the Treaty in the circumstances of this case to undertakings whose registered offices
are situated outside the Community, the Commission has not made an incorrect assessment
of the territorial scope of [Article 81]." Re Wood Pulp Cartel, 4 C.M.L.R. 901, 14.
Moreover, the court in Case 48-69, ICI v. Commission (Dyestuffs), 1972 E.C.R. 619, found
that Article 81(1) will apply to a commercial actor situated outside of the EC that
implements an agreement through a subsidiary situated within the EC. JONES & SUFRIN,
supra, at 135 (citing Cases 48, 49, 51-7/69 1972 E.C.R. 619, 125-146).
9 See STEFAN SZYMANSKI & ANDREW ZIMBALIST, NATIONAL PASTIME: How AMERICANS
PLAY BASEBALL AND THE REST OF THE WORLD PLAYS SOCCER 3 (2005); Louis P. Cain &
David D. Haddock, Similar Economic Histories, Different Industrial Structures:
Transatlantic Contrasts in the Evolution of Professional Sports, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 1116
(2005).
10 See SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 3; Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at
1117-18.
11 See SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 4; Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at
1119.
12 Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1117. See also RICHARD PARRISH & SAMULI
MIETTINEN, THE SPORTING EXCEPTION IN EUROPEAN UNION LAW 20 (2008) (likening U.S.
sports industry to an entertainment industry and distinguishing it from European sport,
"which has traditionally stressed, with or without good cause, the more socio-cultural and
non-commercialized aspects of its activity."); Andreas Joklik, The Legal Status of
Professional Athletes: Differences Between the United States and the European Union
Concerning Free Agency, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 223, 229 (2004) ("[T]here are two remarkable
distinctions between the development [of sports] in the United States and in the different
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A. Legal Structure of the United States' NBA and NFL
The NBA and NFL are both examples of typical U.S. sports leagues
that operate under a mixed-mode private property structure. 13 In both the
NBA and NFL, individual club owners enjoy limited off-the-field
competition as a result of territorial monopolies or duopolies. 14 Existing
clubs further limit competition by controlling the entry of new clubs, as
well as the entry of new players.1
5
NBA and NFL clubs limit the supply of new players through various
league-wide restraints. First, the NBA and NFL clubs have drafted
age/education requirements into their collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs). The NBA CBA states that "[a] player shall be eligible for [entry
into the NBA only if] the player... is or will be at least 19 years of age
during the calendar year in which the Draft is held," and has waited "at least
one (1) NBA Season ... since the player's graduation [or that player's
class's] graduation from high school." 6 Similarly, the NFL CBA stipulates
that a player is not eligible for the NFL draft "until three NFL regular
seasons have begun and ended following either his graduation from high
school or graduation of the class with which he entered high school,
whichever is earlier." 17
Both the NBA and NFL additionally restrain free movement of
prospective players through first-year player drafts and league-wide reserve
systems. 18 The first-year player draft is a procedure under which clubs
allocate negotiating rights to prospective players in inverse order of the
clubs' previous season on-the-field performance. 19  Under both the NBA
member states of the EU. First, in the EU, the intention of many sports clubs traditionally
was not to make money but to win competitions."). This distinction, however, does not
mean that European sports clubs are not also highly.profitable, "as the top-flight English and
German soccer leagues consistently make an operating profit, with broadcasting revenues
remaining the single largest source for income." RICHARD PARRISH, SPORTS LAW AND
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 12 (2003).
13 See Marc Edelman, Why the "Single Entity" Defense Can Never Apply to NFL Clubs:
A Primer on Property-Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 903-04 (2008).
14 Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1117-18. See also SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra
note 9, at 3 (noting that outside of a few large markets, NFL and NBA clubs enjoy a
monopoly).
15 Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1117-18. See also SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra
note 9, at 3.
16 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art. 10, § I(b)(i)
(2005), available at http://www.nbpq.com/cba-articles.php.
17 NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, Art. 16, § 2(b)
(2006), available at http://www.nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20
BARG A1NING%20AGREEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf.
18 See PARRISH & MIETrINEN, supra note 12, at 21.
19 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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and NFL drafts rules, the team with the poorest playing-field record during
the previous season has the first choice of a player seeking to enter the
league for the following season. 20  The team with the next poorest record
has the second choice, and so on until the team with the best record has
picked.2' After each team has selected one player,22 the next round of
drafting then begins in the same order as the first. 3 These rounds continue
until an appropriate number of players is selected.24  These drafts are
designed to promote on-the-field "competitive balance" among teams.
25
The "reserve system," meanwhile, consists of a set of rules whereby
any player, once signed to an initial contract, is bound to play for that club
even beyond the contract's expiration. 26  In the early days of U.S.
professional sports leagues, clubs implemented an extremely restrictive
reserve system that fully restrained player movement for the duration of
players' careers.27 More recently, however, U.S. courts have used antitrust
20 Id. at 1175. Note that the NBA actually uses a weighted lottery system to determine its
draft order, with teams with inferior records having a higher likelihood of selecting earlier.
See Sean Deveney, NBA Draft Lottery Preview, SPORTING NEWS, May 27, 2005, at 8-9. As
a result, sometimes the team with the first pick in the NBA draft does not actually have the
worst record from the previous season. See Bob Velin, Bulls Beat Odds in Draft Lottery,
Land Top Pick, USA TODAY, May 21, 2008 at C1.
21 Smith, 593 F.2d at 1175.





26 Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
27 See Marc Edelman, Moving Past Collusion in Major League Baseball: Healing Old
Wounds, and Preventing New Ones, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 601,604 (2008).
In 1879, however, the National League baseball clubs reached a secret agreement
to 'reserve' up to five players per team that would become perennially bound to
their current employer. A few years later, the National League clubs extended this
secret agreement to include all players that were currently in the league.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 260 n.1 (1972). The Court
stated:
The reserve system, publicly introduced into baseball contracts in 1887 ... centers
in the uniformity of player contracts; the confinement of the player to the club that
has him under the contract; the assignability of the player's contract; and the
ability of the club annually to renew the contract unilaterally, subject to a stated
salary minimum.
Id. (citations omitted); see generally Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610.
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and labor principles to relax reserve systems and allow players some
freedom of movement.
28
B. Legal Structure of European Sports Leagues
By contrast to the U.S. sports league, the European sports league
operates under a pyramid structure, which features merit-based promotion
and relegation of clubs based on clubs' on-the-field performance. 29 Clubs
that perform well on the field regularly replace weaker clubs in higher
divisional play, while the weakest clubs move downward into lower
divisions.30  For example, England's top twenty soccer teams play in the
Premier League.31 Each season, the three best teams from the second-
highest British division are promoted into the Premier League, with the
three weakest teams in the Premier League demoted down a level.32
In Europe, sports leagues have a pyramid structure, with new teams
entering at the bottom of the hierarchy without paying any entry fee. 3 All
that a prospective owner must do is register his team to play in the league's
lowest tier.34  League registration is regulated by each sport's governing
body, rather than by the clubs themselves.35  For example, in European
soccer, the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)
regulates league activity at the world level, and the Union des Associations
Europeennes de Football (UEFA) regulates league activity at the
continental level.36
For a number of years, the NFL has operated under a reserve system whereby
every player who signs a contract with an NFL club is bound to play for that club,
and no other, for the term of the contract plus one additional year at the option of
the club.
Id. 28 See, e.g., Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (finding version of NFL's reserve system and
limited rights to free agent movement violates antitrust law's Rule of Reason); Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming
arbitrator's decision to award free agency in baseball).
29 See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 30; PARRISH, supra note 12, at 9.
30 Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1119. See also SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note
9, at 3.
31 See Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1119.
32 See id.
33 SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 4.
34 See Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1119.
35 See Joklik, supra note 12, at 229-30 (discussing the private governing bodies that have
evolved in European sport).
36 SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 8. See also id. at 48 (FIFA, which was
founded in 1904, is a community of nations that now includes 204 members.); Thomas M.
Schiera, Balancing Act: Will the European Commission Allow European Football to
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In many ways, the European sports model is less restrictive on player
movement than the U.S. model. The European model does not impose any
age or education requirements on new players. By contrast, FIFA recently
passed a series of rules that ensure minors receive appropriate academic
support while playing professionally, and that minors are not transferred
away from their families' homes. 37 These rules serve more to increase the
range of opportunities available to young professional athletes than to
curtail them.
European sports leagues also do not require new players to enter a
first-year player draft. Instead, prospective European professional athletes
are allowed to sign their first contract with any club of their choosing, at
any salary they can obtain on the free market.3 9
Still, there are certain limits on free player movement even under the
European system. For example, after signing an initial contract, the
European "transfer system" prevents players from moving without a
transfer payment.4 ° Under the rules of a typical transfer system, at the end
of a season, each club produces a list of players that it plans to retain for the
Reestablish the Competitive Balance that it Helped to Destroy, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 709,
712-13 (2007).
37 See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 177; PARRISH, supra note 12, at 147
(citing the new FIFA rules that came into effect in September 2001); Jenna Merten, Raising
a Red Flag: Why Freddie Adu Should not be Allowed to Play Professional Soccer, 15 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 205, 219-20 (2004). Parrish and Miettinen explain this new FIFA rule as
follows:
Article 19 of the 2005 FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players
provide that international transfers of players are only permitted if the player is
over the age of 18. Three exceptions to this rule apply. First, if the player's
parents move to a country where the new club is located for reasons not linked to
football. Second, the transfer takes place between 16 and 18, subject to the new
club fulfilling a number of minimum obligations including the provision of
education, training and accommodation. Third, the player lives in further than 50
km from a national border, and the club for which the player wishes to be
registered in the neighboring Association is also within 50 km of that border. The
maximum distance between the player's domicile and the club's quarters shall be
100km. In such cases, the player must continue to live at home and the two
Associations concerned must give their explicit consent.
PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 179.
38 See generally PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 179.
39 The British Football League used to have a maximum pay rule, but that rule was
abolished at the beginning of the 1961 season when players threatened to strike. See
SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 111. In this vein, the European league allows any
entrepreneur with ambition to quickly build a dominant team by signing premier young
talent. See Cain & Haddock, supra note 9, at 1119.
40 See Schiera, supra note 36, at 713.
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following season, and a list of players that are subject to league transfer.4'
Players named on the "transfer list" can be purchased by another club for a
"transfer fee."
42
In recent years, European sports' transfer systems have undergone
substantial reform. Most notably, in September 2001, as a direct result of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruling in the case Union Royale Beige
des Societes de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman,43 the
UEFA outlawed transfer fees for out-of-contract players over the age of
twenty-three.44 As a result, the rights of EuroPean soccer players over the
age of twenty-three have increased immensely.
II. DIFFERENCES IN COMPETITION LAW BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE
In the context of professional sports leagues, competition law applies
somewhat differently in the United States and European Community.
Although competition law in both regions "seeks to ensure the existence of
competitive markets," the particular manner of doing so diverges.46
A. Differences in Competition Law Ideology
U.S. and European competition law emerges from different ideologies.
In the United States, Congress implemented its antitrust laws in response to
the widespread growth of large-scale business. 47 First, in 1890, Congress
41 See id.; PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 172.
42 See Schiera, supra note 36, at 713.
'3 Case C-415/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921.
44 See STEVE GREENFIELD & GUY OSBORN, REGULATING FOOTBALL: COMMODIFICATION,
CONSUMPTION, AND THE LAW 91 (2001); PARRISH, supra note 12, at 147 (explaining that "in
the case of players under age 23, a system of training compensation should be in place to
encourage and reward the training effort of clubs, in particular small clubs."); see generally
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 65 (citing EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 220) (explaining
that "[t]he ECJ, the court of European Communities, has the task of interpreting the law set
out in the Treaty and secondary legislation and ensuring the law is observed."); PARRISH &
MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 177.
45 See Joklik, supra note 12, at 254.
46 E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 1 (3d ed. 1998). See also JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 3.
Competition law is primarily concerned with making markets behave competitively, with the
allocation of resources determined solely by free-market supply and demand. SULLIVAN &
HARRISON, supra, at 1. See also JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 1.
47 See W. KIP VICSUCI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST (MIT Press,
3d. ed. 2001); Marc Edelman, Can Antitrust Law Save the Minnesota Twins: Why
Commissioner Selig's Contraction Plan was Never a Sure Deal, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 45, 56-
57 (2003) ("Enacted in 1890, during the rise of big business and mass production, the
Sherman Act was intended to serve both political and economic purposes and to prevent any
one business from becoming more powerful than the government.").
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passed the Sherman Act to prevent price-fixing arrangements and
monopolization.4 8 Then, in 1914, Congress supplemented the Sherman Act
with the Clayton Act, which, among other things, serves to prevent
anticompetitive business mergers and exempts from the Sherman Act the
combination of employees to form unions.4 9
European Community competition law, by contrast, did not emerge
until 1958, when the Treaty of Rome, to which the original EU Member
States were signatories, went into effect. 50 Unlike its U.S. counterpart,
EC competition law was intended to address both antitrust concerns and a
wide range of policy goals oriented towards the objectives of European
economic integration.51 Many of the concepts that underlie EC competition
law derive from the intellectual ideology that took shape in Austria and
Germany during the 1890s. 52  These pre-existing European ideologies
embrace safeguards for "social justice" alongside competition law's more
general economic purpose. 
53
Historically, the ECJ has applied articles of the Treaty of Rome (and
its more recent successor, the EC Treaty), wherever an athlete's job
performance constitutes a form of economic activity.54 In more recent
years, European sports policy has also begun to recognize "the social and
cultural characteristics of the sports sector within its regulatory
48 See VICSUCI ET AL., supra note 47, at 66.
49 See id. at 67; see also Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2008). According to Section 6
of the Clayton Act:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id. At the same time Congress passed the Clayton Act, it also passed the Federal Trade
Commission Act, which created a special agency to investigate and adjudicate certain forms
of unfair competition. See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 27 (noting that, even then, EC
competition law did not become fully enforceable until the EC passed Regulation 17 in
1962).
50 See Council Regulation 17/13, 1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 204; JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8,
at 27.
51 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 32.
52 See Daniel Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus, in JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 28.
53 Gerber, supra note 52, at 29.
54 See Joklik, supra note 12, at 246.
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approach."55  However, this in no way detracts from the ECJ's broader
principle that professional sport is a form of commercial business, and, as a
commercial business, it is fully subject to regulation by competition law.56
B. Applicable U.S. Competition Law
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The main section of U.S. antitrust law applicable to U.S. sports leagues
is Section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that
"[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or
commerce ... is declared to be illegal." This section of antitrust law
specifically governs the behaviors of price fixing, wage fixing, tying
arrangements, market allocations, and concerted refusals to deal (group
55 PARRISH, supra note 12, at 5. See also id. at 8 ("[T]he ECJ established that sport is
subject to EU law in so far as it constitutes economic activity within the meaning of the EEC
Treaty."); id. at 62 (stressing the balance between the economic approach and the socio-
cultural approach to evaluating sport).
56 See generally Case C-519/04, David Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. Comm'n 2006
ECR 1-4929, para. 18. The court stated:
The Court has consistently held that, having regard to the objectives of the
European Community, sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it
constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 EC. Thus, where
such an activity takes the form of paid employment or the provision of services for
remuneration ... it falls, more specifically, within the scope of [the EC Treaty].
Id.
57 In rare instances sports league conduct has also been challenged Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir. 2002).
The court stated:
Subsequently, at a June 2000 status conference on the remaining section 2 claims,
players indicated (apparently for the first time) that they intended to introduce
evidence that MLS prohibited all competition for players among the MLS
operators/investors as part of their section 2 claim as well ....
A three-month jury trial commenced in September 2000 on players' remaining
section 2 claims. At the close of evidence, the court dismissed the section 2 claims
against the operator/investors.
Id. See also id. at 61-69 (analyzing section 2 claim).
" 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000). Enacted in 1890,
during the rise of big business, the Sherman Act was intended to serve both political and
economic purposes and to prevent any one business from becoming more powerful than the
government. See Edelman, supra note 47, at 56-57.
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boycotts). 59 Even though most agreements that violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act involve product markets, the Sherman Act also prohibits
anticompetitive behaviors in labor markets, such as in markets for
professional athlete services.
60
The U.S. Supreme Court has strongly supported the public policy
rationale against allowing group boycotts. As the Court stated in Eastern
State Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States: 
62
An act harmless when done by one may become a public wrong
when done by many acting in concert, for it then takes on the form of
a conspiracy, and it may be prohibited or punished, if the result be
hurtful to the public or to the individual against whom the concerted
action is directed.63
The danger combated by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, then, is
concerted action that reduces consumers' freedom of choice.64 This
reduction in freedom of choice is "especially troubling because the
consumer loses the opportunity to use purchasing power to indicate a
preference for boycotted products, materials, or labor sources. 65
A U.S. court's prima facie review of potential violations looks at the
challenged conduct using one of the U.S. Supreme Court's three sanctioned
tests. 66 If the court determines that the conduct is "so pernicious that [it
has] no redeeming value, a court will apply the per se test, which presumes
there is a prima facie case of an antitrust violation without any further
investigation of alleged justifications. 67 This first test "is a bright line rule
59 SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 159-67. See also MICHAEL J. COZZILLIO ET
AL., SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 278 (2d. ed. 2007); Marc Edelman & C. Keith
Harrison, Analyzing the WNBA's Age/Education Requirement from a Legal, Ethical, and
Cultural Perspective: Women, Men, and the Professional Sports Landscape, 3 NW J. L. &
Soc. POL'Y 1, 35-36 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/joumals/njlsp/v3/nl/1
/1 Edelman.pdf.
60 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, TT 35-36 (citing various sources).
61 Id. at 36 (citing Klor's Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)); see
also SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at § 4.13.
62 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
63 Id. at 614.
64 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 37 (citing Fashion Originator's Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 160-
61).
65 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 37 (citing SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note
46, at 164).
66 Id. at T 38.
67 Id. (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 140, 224, n.59 (1940); SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra
note 46, at 124-31).
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that facilitates legal certainty and promotes judicial economy," 68 and its
purpose "is to avoid 'subjective policy judgments' that most courts
recognize 'are more appropriate for legislative, rather than judicial,
determination, ' '' 69 as well as to preserve judicial resources where the type
of agreement is one that courts review regularly and have no doubt is
illegal, even upon first impression.70
Where the harm caused by the challenged conduct is less apparent, "a
court will apply Rule of Reason analysis, under which a court conducts a
full economic investigation to determine whether the defendants' behavior
is legal.",71 Under this test, "a court will determine whether a plaintiff can
make a prima facie showing of a violation based on the presence of the
following three factors: (1) market power; (2) anticompetitive effects that
exceed any pro-competitive justifications; and (3) harm. 72  Where the
challenged conduct is "neither completely pernicious nor completely
ambiguous, the court will apply a third type of test, called either the 'quick
look' or 'truncated' Rule of Reason., 73 Under this test the court examines
economic effects "based on only a 'rudimentary understanding of
economics.'74
Commentators see antitrust law in "'creeping transition,' as courts are
moving away from applying the per se test and toward applying either the
quick-look test, or, even more frequently, the full Rule of Reason., 75 The
transition is the result of changing ideas in industrial economics-ideas that
"cast doubt on traditional notions about competitive effects. 7 6 This shift
has been especially dramatic in the area of joint venture law, where today,
according to the Supreme Court, all joint ventures are reviewed exclusively
68 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 1 38 (citing SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note
46, at 126; Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 49, 57 (2007)).
69 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 38 (quoting Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n,
439 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Conn. 1977)).
70 See Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[Als the courts
gained experience with antitrust problems[,] they identified certain types of agreements
which were so consistently unreasonable that they could be deemed illegal per se, without
elaborate inquiry into their purported justifications.").
71 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 39 (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Prof I Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978)).
72 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 39 (citing 54 AM. JUR. 2D. MONOPOLIES AND
RESTRAINTS OF TRADE § 49 (2007)).
73 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 40 (citing Cal Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 763-64, 770 (1999)).
74 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 40 (quoting Cal Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 763-
64, 770).
75 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 41 (quoting Crane, supra note 68, at 50).
76 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 41 (citing Crane, supra note 68, at 51).
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under the Rule of Reason. 7
2. Labor Exemptions to Section 1 of the Sherman Act
If a plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing of an antitrust
violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the alleged conspirators then
may seek to defend their conduct by arguing that one of a series of defenses
and exemptions to Section 1 of the Sherman Act applies.78 In the context of
professional sports leagues, the two most applicable defenses or exemptions
to Section 1 of the Sherman Act are the statutory labor exemption and the
non-statutory labor exemption.79
a. Statutory Labor Exemption
The statutory labor exemption, which is contained in Section 6 of the
Clayton Act, states that antitrust laws do not apply to union organizations or
to union members that act within the legitimate objectives of a union.
80
This exemptioi was designed to further congressional policy favoring
collective bargaining.8 1 To qualify for the statutory labor exemption, union
members must act collectively in their own self-interest for legitimate
union purposes, and not in combination with non-union or third party
groups.
82
b. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The non-statutory labor exemption is a court-created exemption,
resulting from judicial decisions to give aspects of collective bargaining
agreements further immunity from antitrust law.83 The non-statutory
77 See Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3 (2006). The Court stated:
We granted certiorari to determine whether it is per se illegal under § 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a lawful, economically integrated joint venture to
set the prices at which the joint venture sells its products. We conclude that it is
not, and accordingly we reverse the contrary judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Id. See also id. at 7 (stating that a joint venture's challenged price unification policy must be
reviewed under the Rule of Reason).
78 See COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 59, at 297-300 ("Antitrust Exemptions").
79 See Joklik, supra note 12, at 239.
80 SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 78 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 17). See also Joklik,
supra note 12, at 239 ("The statutory labor exemption is based on the Clayton Act and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and applies only to unilateral union activities and not to the
relationship between an employer and the union members."); supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
81 SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 46, at 78.
82 Id.
83 See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW 221 (3d ed. West
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exemption has an important place in sports law because players'
associations (unions) collectively bargain with teams (employers) to form a
league's collective bargaining agreement. 
84
The non-statutory labor exemption comes from the public policy
rationale that "employees are better off negotiating together rather than
individually, and therefore labor law (rather than antitrust law) should apply
to situations where collective bargaining occurs. 8 5 Courts have inferred
the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption "from federal labor statutes,
which set forth a national labor policy of favoring free and private
collective bargaining, which require good faith bargaining [with respect to
mandatory terms and conditions of employment], and which delegate
related rulemaking and interpretive authority to the National Labor
Relations Board."'8W The non-statutory labor exemption therefore not only
protects National Labor Relations Board authority but also "allow[s]
meaningful collective bargaining to take place. 87
There is a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals about how broadly
the non-statutory labor exemption applies. In 1976, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National Football League
88
held that the non-statutory labor exemption applies only where an alleged
restraint of trade: (1) involves mandatory subjects of bargaining;
(2) primarily affects the parties involved; and (3) is reached through bona
fide, arm's-length bargaining (the Mackey Test). 89  Over the past thirty
years, many courts have followed the Mackey Test. 90
Meanwhile, in 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in Clarett v. Nat'l Football League91 held that the non-statutory labor
exemption has a broader application, and that it applies most broadly where
the alleged antitrust injuries affect employees rather than competitors (the
2004); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 676, 710 (1965) ("[Iln order to
effectuate congressional intent, collective bargaining activity concerning mandatory subjects
of bargaining under the Labor Act is not subject to antitrust laws.").
84 See generally COZZILLIO ET AL., supra note 59, at ch. 9 ("Antitrust and Sports: the
Labor Exemption"); WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 221-62 ("Labor Exemption from
Antitrust").
85 Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 42 (citing Pennington, 381 U.S. at 710; Michael
McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from
the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 196 (2004)).
86 Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 236 (1996).
87 Id. at 237.
88 543 F.2d 606.
89 Id. at 614.
90 See, e.g., In Re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, 955 F.2d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 1992);
McCourt v. California Sports Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1197 (6th Cir. 1979); Zimmerman v. Nat'l
Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 403-04 (D.D.C. 1986).
91 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005).
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Clarett Test). 92 According to the Second Circuit, the non-statutory labor
exemption may apply to any mandatory subject of bargaining where the
exemption's application would "ensure the successful operation of the
collective bargaining process. 93  Being "far broader than the Mackey
Test," the Clarett Test may insulate from liability many sports league CBAs
that would be subject to liability under Mackey.94  Nevertheless, some
believe that the Second Circuit's Clarett Test is overly broad and will
eventually be struck down by the Supreme Court. 
95
C. European Competition Law Under the EC Treaty
Similar to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the main section of EC
competition law, as relevant to sports, is Article 81 of the EC Treaty.
96
Article 81 prevents anti-competitive collusion among competitors. 97 In
addition, Article 39 of the EC Treaty regulates the freedom of movement
for workers. 98  Article 39 serves as an important part of EC quasi-
92 Id. at 131, 134.
9' Id. at 143.
94 See Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 44.
95 See, e.g., Michael Scheinkman, Comment, Running Out of Bounds: Overextending the
Labor Antitrust Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
733, 767 (2005). Scheinkman writes:
This Comment has suggested that in Clarett v. National Football League, the
Second Circuit extended the nonstatutory exemption beyond its original scope-
protecting the NFL's eligibility rule that neither covered a mandatory bargaining
subject nor stemmed from actual collective bargaining. The Clarett decision set a
dangerous precedent, tipping the scales of the delicate balance between federal
labor law and antitrust law too far in favor of labor law.
Id.
96 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, at arts. 81 & 82 (formerly, respectively, Articles 85 & 86
of the Treaty of Rome); see also JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 71-72; PARRISH &
MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 103, 110. Section 82, which concerns the "abuses of a
dominant position," also plays an important role in European sports law; however, this
section is less important with respect to a mixed-mode professional sports league such as the
NBA and NFL because clubs in these leagues are seen as separate entities. See Edelman,
supra note 13, at 893, n.ll and accompanying text. Cf EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 81;
PARRISH, supra note 12, at I11.
97 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 81.
98 See id. at 39 (formerly Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome); see also JONES & SUFRIN,
supra note 8, at 71-72; PARRISH & MIETrINEN, supra note 12, at 103, 110 ("Following
Meca-Medina, it is clear that the analytical process of determining whether a particular rule
constitutes a restriction under free movement or under competition law is not identical in
relation to sporting rules. Compatibility under one does not a priori lead to a similar
conclusion under the other.").
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competition policy. 99
1. Treaty Article 81
Article 81 of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome) prohibits agreements among commercial actors that prevent, restrict,
or distort competition based on either their object or effect on Member
States.100 Article 81(1) specifically disallows any agreements that "fix
purchase or selling prices," 10' "limit or control production, markets,
technical development, or investments,"' 10 2 "share markets or sources of
supply,' 0 3 treat certain trading parties inferiorly to others, 10 4 or "make the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties [that] have no
connection with the subject of such contracts."
'1°5
All violations of Article 81(1) are per se illegal. However, EC case
law recognizes a de minimis exception to Article 81 (1) where the colluding
parties control, in total, less than five percent of the total relevant market.'
0W
EC case law also recognizes that where "a rule which at first sight appears
to contain a restriction that is necessary in order to make that competition
possible in the first place, it must be assumed that rule does not infringe
Article [81(l)].
' 107
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty provides a discretionary exemption
from Article 81(1) for agreements that (1) provide specified benefits (either
improving production or distribution, or promoting technical or economic
progress), and (2) allow "consumers the fair share of the resulting benefit,"
as long as (3) the agreement is "indispensable to the attaining of [Article
81(l)'s] objectives," and (4) does not "afford... the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question." ° 8 The Commission has the "sole power ... to declare Article
[81 (1)] inapplicable pursuant to Article [81(3)] of the Treaty." 109
The specified benefits giving rise to an 81(3) exemption are generally
99 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 39.
.0. See id. at art. 81(1); Schiera, supra note 36, at 727.
101 EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 81(1)(a).
102 Id. at art. 81(1)(b).
Id. at art. 81(1)(c).
'04 Id. at art. 81(1)(d).
105 Id. at art. 81(l)(e).
106 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Effect of Trade Concept Contained in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101/81) para. 46.
107 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Des Societes De Football Ass'n ASBL v. Jean-
Marc Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-4921, para. 265. See also PARRISH & MIETrINEN, supra note 12,
at 119 (citing same).
o8 EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 81(3). See also JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 137.
109 JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 200 (citing 1959-62 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87).
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economic; however, in rare instances, the Commission has awarded an
Article 81(3) exemption based on purely social reasons. 11 0 In the context of
sport, the Commission has tried to put a stop to restrictive practices that
have a significant economic impact, and are unjustified in light of the goal
of improving production and distribution of resources.'' However,
according to at least one former EC commissioner, the Commission may
show leniency toward certain sports practices that play an important role in
fortifying the sport's existence. "'
The Commission's exact standard for applying Article 81(3) is
vague.1 1 3 Because the Commission may at times pursue social policy as
well as hard economic analysis, certain public policy arguments in favor of
allowing collusive conduct could carry greater weight under Article 81(3)
review than they would under the Sherman Act's Rule-of-Reason pro-
competitive effects doctrine. 114 Nevertheless, the strength of these policy-
based arguments, even in Europe, remains highly speculative. 
1 5
2. Labor Exemption to Treaty Section 81
Unlike U.S. competition law, EC law does not have a statutory labor
110 See Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 art. 1, 2003 O.J. (L 1), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numd
oc=32003R0001&model=guichett; JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 193-96 (discussing
cases where the ECJ has found socially desirable results, such as increasing employment
rates, decreasing pollution, or increasingly product safety, may each justify otherwise
anticompetitive behavior); PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 108 ("Under Article 10
of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission may take a decision that an arrangement is not
prohibited under Article 81 or 82 because it is in the Community's public interest."); id. at
124 ("Within [the Article 81(3) legal] framework it would appear open to the Commission to
also consider sporting reasons as legitimate aims.").
111 Jean Francois Pons, Deputy Director General, Directorate-General IV-Competition,
Sport and European Competition Policy, Address at Fordham Corporate Law Inst., Twenty-
Sixth Annual Conference on Int'l Antitrust Law & Policy, (Oct. 14-15, 1999), at 6.
112 Id. See generally PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 36 (explaining that the
1999 White Paper known as the Helsinki Report on Sport, which has no binding effect,
suggests using the 81(3) exemption for rules that are both sporting and economic in nature);
id. at 124.
113 See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 140-42.
114 See generally JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 199 ("The Commission, when
considering whether to exempt an agreement concerning the collective selling of
broadcasting rights for [soccer], may be willing to extend the analysis beyond 'simple
economic considerations."'). Cf, PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 109 ("US
competition law is founded on a balancing exercise between the anti-competitive and pro-
competitive effects of agreements. Despite some similarities, the ECJ has consistently
denied that a similar doctrine exists in Community competition law.").
115 See PARRISH & MIETrIEN, supra note 12, at 142 ("[T]his process may involve some
legal uncertainty.").
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exemption. 116 Nevertheless, in recent years the ECJ has carved out
something similar to the U.S. non-statutory labor exemption for agreements
reached between employers and employees in multi-employer collective
bargaining. The European non-statutory labor exemption is in certain ways
narrower than its U.S. counterpart.
The ECJ first addressed the issue of whether EC competition law
recognizes a non-statutory labor exemption in dicta to the 1995 Bosman
case, which pertained to whether professional soccer's international transfer
system violated competition and quasi-competition law principles. 117 In
Bosman, the UEFA clubs argued that the professional soccer transfer
system could not violate Article 81 because "the relationship between
employer and employee is not.., subject to the provisions of competition
law."' 1 s To support this position, the UEFA clubs incorrectly cited U.S.
law explaining the importance of applying a non-statutory labor
exemption. 119 Ultimately, the Bosman court held that the UEFA argument
was of no relevance because that case did not "concern collective
agreements but simple horizontal agreements between the clubs."' 20
However, the court, for the first time, acknowledged that where parties
reach agreements through collective bargaining, it may be necessary to
exclude certain aspects of these agreements from competition law. 12'
The ECJ again addressed the potential existence of a non-statutory
labor exemption in the 1999 case Brentjens Handelsonderneming BV v.
Stichting,'2 in which it stated that terms of a collective bargaining
agreement that contribute directly to improving working conditions are
exempt from Article 81.123 Then, in the 2000 case Albany International B V
v. Stichting,124 which related to the legality under Article 81 of a labor
agreement that required employees to contribute to a pension fund, the ECJ
set forth the specific standard to apply a non-statutory labor exemption.
25
116 See Stefan Szymanski, Is There a European Model of Sports?, in INTERNATIONAL
SPORTS ECONOMICS COMPARISONS 19, 33 (Rodney Fort & John Fizel eds., 2004) ("Unions in
Europe, without protection of an antitrust exemption, have in general held a much weaker
position,").
117 Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-4921, paras. 254-78. See PARISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12,
at 173.
118 Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-4921, para. 271.
119 See id.
120 Id. para. 275.
121 Id. para. 274. The court went on to explain that "[a] corresponding restriction of the
scope of Article [8 1]-similar to that already existing in laws of individual Member States-
might indeed exist." Id. However, even if there were such an exemption, "[i]t would be
admittedly limited in character." Id.
122 Cases C-1 15/97 to C-1 17/97, 1999 ECR 1-6025,
123 See id. paras. 56-60.
124 Case C-67/96, 1999 ECR 1-5751.
125 Id. paras. 191-93.
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In that case, the ECJ concluded that a non-statutory labor exemption to
Article 81 must apply where the purportedly anti-competitive conduct
emerges from "collective agreements between management and [labor]
concluded in good faith on core subjects of collective bargaining such as
wages and working conditions which do not directly affect third markets
and third parties."'1
6
One year later, the ECJ again heard arguments pertaining to the scope
of a non-statutory labor exemption in the case Van der Woude v. Stichting
Beatrixoord.127 Somewhat similar to the facts in Albany, Van der Woude
involved employees forced to contribute to an employer insurance company
that provided health insurance.1 28  In addressing whether such conduct
violated Article 81, the Van der Woude court applied Albany and granted
antitrust immunity because the insurance payment plan was part of the
collective bargaining agreement that affected only those directly involved in
the agreement and it also construed a core subject of bargaining.
129
"Accordingly, [under EC law], collective agreements [today] enjoy a
limited antitrust immunity." 1
30
3. Treaty Article 39
Beyond Article 81, the EC Treaty further protects "freedom of
movement of workers" by using quasi-competition principles that emerge
from Article 39 of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 48 of the Treaty of
Rome). 131 Article 39, in essence, gives each citizen of an EC Member State
the right to move and work in any country of the EC.132 Article 39 also
prohibits EC Member States from passing statutes that violate this right,
and prevents independent parties from passing industry rules to curtail these
rights. 133 Although courts occasionally conflate Article 39 with more
126 Id. para. 194.
127 Case C-222/98, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111.
128 Id. paras. 11-17,
129 Id. paras. 22-27. Thus, Van der Woude reinforces the ECJ's earlier holding in
Albany. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130 Case C-438/05, Int'l Transp. Workers' Fed'n v. Viking Line ABP 2007 ECR 1-10779,
para. 27 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
131 EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39(l)-(3).
132 Joklik, supra note 12, at 246. Additionally, EU free movement rules can be relied
upon by non-EU nationals if there is an international agreement in place with a third state,
and the non-discriminatory provision is directly effective, thus allowing nationals of a state
subject to the agreement to rely on it before a national court. PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra
note 12, at 193.
133 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39(1)-(3); see also PARRISH, supra note 12, at 83
(noting that Article 39 of the EC Treaty comes from the Treaty's more general requirement
in Article 3(c) with respect to the abolition, as between member states, of obstacles to the
free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital); Joklik, supra note 12, at 246.
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traditional European competition law under Article 81, the two articles
serve different purposes. Indeed, certain conduct that is permissible
under Article 81 may still violate Article 39. 13
Like Article 81, Article 39 has always applied to the commercial
conduct of professional sports leagues. 136  In the 1974 case Walrave &
Koch v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale,137 the ECJ held that
what is now known as Article 39 of the EC Treaty may apply against sports
rules that discriminate based upon nationality.1 38 The ECJ further held that
Article 39 applies even to work situations carried out outside the EU if the
legal relationship of employment was entered into inside the EU, as well as
if the legal relationship was formed outside the EU but the effect of the
measure is felt within it. 139 This view has since been affirmed by the ECJ
in both the 1976 case Dond v. Mantero,140 and the 1987 case UNECTEF v.
Heylens. 141
In Bosman, 142 the ECJ implemented an even broader view of the
"freedom of workers," explaining that in the context of professional
soccer's transfer rules, UEFA's system of mandatory transfer payments
violated Article 39 even though these restrictions did not particularly
discriminate on the basis of nationality. 143 Although the ECJ recognized
the aims of maintaining financial and competitive balance among sports
teams were legitimate, the ECJ still disclaimed UEFA's transfer rules as not
134 See lnt'l Transp., 2007 ECR 1-10779, para. 26 ("[T]he fact that an agreement or
activity is excluded from the scope of the competition rules does not necessarily mean that is
also excluded from the scope of the rules on freedom of movement.").
135 See id.
136 Additionally, in recent years there is some abolition, as between member states, of
obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. There also exists
support for an even broader proposition that Article 39 today governs even the non-
economic rules of sport. See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 101 (explaining that
in the field of fundamental freedoms, the ECJ has even applied principles of free movement
to entirely social matters such as family movement with migrant workers).
137 Case 36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.
138 Id. para. 25. See Joklik, supra note 12, at 246-47. Cf PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra
note 12, at 1 (explaining the holding of Walrave is limited to where the practice of sport in
considered economic activity under the meaning of the Treaty).
139 Wairave, 1974 ECR 1405, para. 28.
140 Case C-13/76, Gaetano Dona v. Mario Mantero, 1976 ECR 1333.
141 Case C-222/86, Unectefv. Georges Heylens, 1987 ECR 4097.
142 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921.
143 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 4 ("[Hlaving regard to the objectives of the
Community, the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes
an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty."). See also PARRISH &
MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 86-89; PARRISH, supra note 12, at 99 ("As such, the ECJ held
that the application of Article 39 went beyond a mere prohibition of discrimination but
extended to all restrictions."); SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 114.
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being the least restrictive means available to obtain competitive balance. 144
In the years following Bosman, the European Commission negotiated a
settlement agreement with FIFA and UEFA that has allowed professional
soccer clubs to continue to claim transfer fees on players up until the age of
23, as a reflection of investments made in the player's development. 
45
Nonetheless, more recent ECJ rulings have confirmed the view that the ECJ
is not loosening up its enforcement of Article 39.146
Recently, the ECJ made clear that the right to freedom of movement is
nearly absolute. 147  Specifically, the ECJ will not award any exemption
under Article 39 based on either economic or social benefits, or based on a
purported non-statutory labor exemption.1 48 Those social policy defenses
are limited to Article 81.
III. LEGALITY OF NBA AND NFL AGE/EDUCATION
REQUIREMENTS
The legal status of age/education requirements is more favorable to
professional sports leagues under U.S. law than under EC law. In the
United States, the legality of the NBA and NFL's age/education
requirements depends upon how broadly a court interprets the U.S. non-
statutory labor exemption. 49  Although both the NBA and NFL
age/education requirements present prima facie violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, if the reviewing court applies the Clarett Test, the
requirements will be exempt from antitrust liability because they involve
mandatory subjects of bargaining where applying the exemption would
"ensure the successful operation of the collective bargaining process." 150
144 See Bosman, 1995 E.C. R. 1-492 1, paras. 105-10; PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note
12, at 174. As a result, the court in Bosman held that an EU national not subject to an
ongoing contract was free to sign with any club of his choosing without his new club having
to pay a transfer fee to his former one. SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 114. With
respect to UEFA's claim that an adverse ruling would have huge consequences on
professional soccer, the ECJ held that the consequences of the judgment cannot interfere
with applying the principles of law. PARRISH, supra note 12, at 95. Of further importance,
the ECJ decided to view the transfer rules as restrictions despite the fact that the existence of
the transfer rules did not make it more difficult for a player to move between clubs in
different member states than between clubs in the same state. Id. at 95.
145 See SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 114; PARRISH, supra note 12, at 147.
146 See PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12.
147 PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12, at 69-70.
141 See Int'l Transp., 2007 ECR 1-10779 paras. 25-26; see also PARRISH & MIETTINEN,
supra note 12, at 112, 221 (explaining that even if a collectively bargained salary cap in
soccer was exempted from Article 81 based on the non-statutory labor exemption, "if the cap
restricted a player's right of free movement, it would still be susceptible to challenge under
Article 39.").
149 See supra Part II.B.2.b.
"0 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143.
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By contrast, in the European Community, the NBA and NFL
age/education requirements most likely violate Article 81 of the EC
Treaty. 15' Not only do the NBA and NFL age/education requirements
present prima facie violations under the plain language of Article 81, but
these requirements are not likely insulated from liability by the EC's
version of the non-statutory labor exemption because the age/education
requirements "directly affect ... third parties."'
152
A. Analysis Under the Sherman Act
Applying Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the legality of the NBA and
NFL's age/education requirements hinges upon which test for the non-
statutory labor exemption a court applies. If a court applies the Second
Circuit's Clarett Test, the NBA and NFL age/education requirements are
likely exempt from antitrust scrutiny as mandatory subjects of bargaining
that would "ensure the successful operation of the collective bargaining
process."'153 However, if a court applies the Eighth Circuit's Mackey Test,
it is uncertain whether or not the NBA and NFL age/education requirements
are exempt because it is not absolutely clear whether these requirements
"primarily affect[] only the parties to the collective bargaining
relationship."'
' 54
1. Unilaterally Implemented Age/Education Requirements
It is relatively well-settled that under the Sherman Act unilaterally
implemented age/education requirements meet the prima facie test for an
antitrust violation, irrespective of what standard of review is applied.
Courts in the United States have reviewed unilaterally implemented
age/education requirements in premier professional sports leagues on three
separate occasions, each time finding an antitrust violation. In the first of
these challenges, Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management Inc.,'" the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California overturned an NBA rule
that required all prospective men's basketball players to wait at least four
years after completing their high school education before applying for the
151 See supra Part 11.C,.
152 Joined Cases C-67/96, C-1 15-17/97 & C-219/97, Albany Int'l BV v. Stichting
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, 2000 C.M.L.R. 446, para. 296;
Case C-22/98, Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R, 1-7111, paras. 22-27.
... Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143 (emphasis omitted).
14 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. See also Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 69 ("(T]he
fact that a prospective league entrant is not yet a union member creates at least the possibility
that a court might interpret this prong as unmet."); Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. 398 at 405
("Not only present but potential future players for a professional sports league are parties to
the bargaining relationship.").
' 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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league draft. 156 The NBA thereafter moved for a stay of this ruling, which
was granted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, but was
subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court. 
157
In awarding prospective NBA player Haywood his request for
summary judgment, the court applied the per se rule, explaining that three
different types of harm emerged from the NBA age/education restriction. 1
58
The court stated:
First, the victim of the boycott is injured by being excluded from the
market he seeks to enter. Second, competition in the market in
which the victim attempts to sell his services is injured. Third, by
pooling their economic power, the individual members of the NBA
have, in effect, established their own private government. 1
59
Six years later in Linseman v. World Hockey Association,160 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Connecticut overturned another
age/education requirement in sports, finding the facts of that case
"indistinguishable from the Spencer Haywood case."' 161  In Linseman,
nineteen-year-old amateur Canadian hockey player Kenneth Linseman
brought a preliminary injunction suit against the World Hockey Association
(WHA), contending that the league's prohibition against players under the
age of twenty violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 162 Consistent with the
court's earlier decision in Denver Rockets, the Linseman court found that
the WHA age/education requirement amounted to a per se illegal refusal to
deal, and that there was not any valid purpose to the WHA rule.163  The
court noted: "Exclusion of traders from the market by means of
combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles
embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the
need for preserving the collaborators' profit margins." 64
Once again in Boris v. United States Football League,' 65 the District
Court for the Central District of California struck down an age/education
"' Id. at 1066-67; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 45.
157 Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., No. 71-1089, 1971 WL 3015, at * 1 (9th Cir,
Feb. 16, 1971) rev'd sub nom. Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1206-07
(1971); Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, at 45.
158 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061, 1066; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59,
747.
159 Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061.
160 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977).
161 Id. at 1326.
162 Id. at 1317; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 49.
163 See Linseman, 439 F, Supp. at 1321-26; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 49.
164 Linseman, 439 F. Supp. at 1322 (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127, 146 (1966)).
165 No. Cv. 83-4980 LEW (Kx), 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984).
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requirement, this time involving the United States Football League-a
league that sought to compete against the NFL.1 66  In Boris, plaintiff
football player Robert Boris challenged an age/education requirement of the
United States Football League, which mandated that all prospective players
exhaust their college eligibility before entering the draft. 67 Ultimately, the
parties reached a settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. 168 In the
opinion approving the proposed terms of settlement, the court overturned
the age/education requirement, which it found per se illegal. 169
Recently, courts have shifted away from using the per se test to review
age/education requirements and have moved toward applying either a quick
look test or the full Rule of Reason test. 70 This change in the applicable
standard has not, so far, led any court to find that age/education
requirements do not generally present prima facie violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 171
2. Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements
Where an age/education requirement is collectively bargained, the
non-statutory labor exemption nevertheless might insulate the requirement
from antitrust liability. 172 In the most recent challenge to an age/education
requirement in professional sports, Clarett v. National Football League,
173
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an age/education
requirement under the non-statutory labor exemption.1 74  In Clarett, the
Second Circuit explained that the NFL's age/education requirement
involved a mandatory term of bargaining (wages), 175 and that subjecting the
166 Id. at * 1.
167 Id. at * 1-2; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 50.
168 Boris, 1984 WL 894, at *4; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 50.
169 Boris, 1984 WL 894, at *1; Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, 50.
170 See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd
on other grounds 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The [NFL age/education requirement] is the
perfect example of a policy that is appropriately analyzed under the "quick look" standard
because its anticompetitive effects are so obvious."); see also id. at 405 ("[T]he parties agree
that the rule of reason applies because the challenged restraint arises in the context of a
sports league.").
171 See Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 405, n.164 (finding the NFL's age/education
requirement presented a prima facie violation of the Sherman Act even when reviewed under
either a quick look or full Rule of Reason review).
172 See supra Part II.B.2.b; see also Clarett, 369 F.3d at 125 (finding the NFL
age/education requirement insulated from antitrust scrutiny by the non-statutory labor
exemption).
173 369 F.3d 124.
174 Id. at 125.
175 Id. at 139-41 (explaining that "the eligibility rules for the draft represent a quite literal
condition for initial employment and for that reason alone might constitute a mandatory
bargaining subject.... [M]oreover, the eligibility rules constitute a mandatory bargaining
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requirement to antitrust review "would subvert fundamental principles of
our federal labor policy."' 17 6 Therefore, the court found the non-statutory
labor exemption applied against finding antitrust liability. 177
Most other U.S. courts have taken a far more narrow view of the non-
statutory labor exemption, applying instead the more traditional Mackey
Test, which exempts from antitrust liability only collective bargaining
agreements that (1) involve mandatory subjects of bargaining, (2) primarily
affect the parties involved, and (3) are reached though bona fide, arm's-
length bargaining. 178 Under the Mackey Test, there is little question that
both the NBA and NFL age/education requirements involve mandatory
subjects of bargaining, reached through bona fide arm's-length
bargaining. 179 However, it is not clear whether the requirements "primarily
affect[] only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship."'
8
Looking specifically at the "primarily affect[] only the parties to the
collective bargaining relationship" prong, even applying the Mackey Test,
courts may find that the NBA and NFL age/education requirements
primarily affect the parties to the CBA because both of the parties involved
(the member clubs and the boycotted player) are within the scope of the
collective bargaining process and not "economic actors completely removed
from the bargaining relationship."' 81 Yet, the fact that a prospective league
entrant is not a union member creates some possibility that certain courts
might find this prong unmet. 182 To date, no court applying the Mackey Test
subject because they have tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of current
NFL players.").
176 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138.
... See id. at 125.
178 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
179 See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139-41; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615; Edelman & Harrison, supra
note 59, 67.
180 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614. See supra, notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
181 Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405. See also Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, T 69.
As explained by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Clarett (although it is not exactly
clear if that court is incorporating the second prong of Mackey into its own test), a
prospective professional athlete that is excluded from a sports league based on an
age/education policy is "no different from the typical worker who is confident that he or she
has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not possess the qualifications or meet the
requisite criteria that have been set." Id. (quoting Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141).
182 See Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA
and NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 731, 747 (2006) ("[P]layers not within the labor
organization have no one at the bargaining table. Obviously, existing players have an
interest in keeping top amateur players out of the NFL because doing so preserves existing
jobs that would otherwise go to better, younger players.") (quoting Michael A. McCann); id.
at 762 ("Age eligibility should not be covered by the labor exemption because it primarily
affects workers outside of the bargaining unit. It is an exemption to the antitrust laws and is
supposed to be narrowly construed.") (quoting Alan Milstein); see also Edelman & Harrison,
supra note 59, 68-69.
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has addressed whether a professional sports labor union represents, for
collective bargaining purposes, players that are not allowed to enter the
league in that year's draft.'8 3  Therefore, a court outside of the Second
Circuit might find that a collectively bargained age/education requirement
affects non-parties to the bargaining process.
184
B. Analysis Under the EC Treaty
It is clearer that the NBA and NFL age/education requirements would
be found illegal under Article 81 of the EC Treaty.
1. Prima Facie Case Under EC Treaty
Although the ECJ has never addressed the issue of age/education
requirements in the context of professional sports leagues (this is because
European sports leagues allow players to join at any age), the ECJ would
most likely find that both the NBA and NFL age/education requirements
violate Article 81 of the EC Treaty by preventing, restricting, and distorting
competition by "limit[ing] or control[ing] production [and] markets."'
8
Specifically, both the NBA and NFL age/education requirements limit
production by denying individual clubs access to labor inputs of younger
and less educated players.' 86 In doing so, both the NBA and NFL deprive
individual clubs of the opportunity to hire what may be the highest caliber
potential labor source. In addition, the NBA and NFL requirements deprive
consumers of the choice to watch what they may perceive as a superior
product-professional basketball and football games that include the
highest possible caliber players.
The NBA and NFL age/education requirements clearly fall within the
scope of Article 81(1).187 The NFL and NBA clubs do not qualify for a de
minimus exception to Article 81(1) because both the NBA and NFL have
more than five percent of the total relevant market, irrespective of whether
the highest European professional leagues are considered part of the same
market as the NBA clubs. 188 In addition, the ECJ would not deem the NBA
183 See Marc Edelman, Sports and the Law: NBA Age/Education Requirement Pushes
Jennings Overseas, ABOVE THE LAW, July 14, 2008, http://www.abovethelaw.com/2008/07
/sports-andjthelaw_nbaageeduc.php.
184 See McCann & Rosen, supra note 182, at 747, 762.
185 EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 81(1)(b). See also id. art. 81(1).
186 See id. at art. 81; see generally Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1061 (explaining the
effect of age/education requirements on market competition in the context of U.S. antitrust
review).
187 See supra Part II.C.1.
188 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Effect of Trade Concept Contained in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101/81) para. 46; see also Commission Notice
on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition
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and NFL age/education requirements "necessary in order to make that
competition possible in the first place."1 89 There is no bona fide argument
that without these requirements clubs would play fewer games or go out of
business entirely. For example, the NBA did not enforce any age/education
requirement from 1971 until 2006.190 Yet, during this period, club
profitability soared and the league significantly expanded its total number
of clubs.19
Additionally, age/education requirements are unlikely to merit a
special exemption under Article 81(3). 192 The age/education requirements
do not improve distribution.19
3 They do not promote technical progress.
194
They also do not promote economic progress.
At the same time, consumers do not gain any of the financial benefits
from the NBA and NFL age/education requirements. 196 To date, neither the
NBA nor NFL has presented any evidence to indicate that ticket prices have
become more affordable directly because of their age/education
requirements.
To the extent the European Commission is willing to consider social
policy in support of an Article 81(3) exemption (and that issue, in itself, is
somewhat unsettled), 197 there is no strong argument that the NBA and
NFL's age/education requirements meet an important European Community
goal. 198  The European Commission has not expressed concern over the
mere fact that minors are working as athletes, and while the age/education
requirements of both the NBA and the NFL are not primarily geared toward
Under Article 81(1) of the Treaty, 2001 O.J. (C 368/13) para. 8 (stating that horizontal
agreements between commercial actors with aggregate market power of less than 5 percent
of the relevant market are simply exempt from Article 81 (1)).
189 Bosman, 1995 ECR 1-492 1, para. 265. See also PARRISH & MIETTINEN, supra note 12,
at 119 (citing same); supra note 12 and accompanying text.
190 Compare Jack N.E. Pitts Jr., Note, Why Wait: An Antitrust Analysis of the National
Football League and National Basketball Association's Draft Rules, 51 How. L.J. 433, 435
(2008) ("Up until 2005, to join the ranks of the NBA, student-athletes only needed a high
school diploma. Under this condition, the NBA experienced a steady flow of high school
players entering the draft."), with Brian Shaffer, Comment, The NBA s Age/Education
Requirement Shoots and Misses: How the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption Produces
Inequitable Results for High School Basketball Stars, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 681, 684
(2008) ("The 1990s, however, saw an explosion of high school talent entering the NBA.").
191 See 20 Years Under Stern, USA TODAY, Oct. 28, 2003 at I-E; see also David L.
Andrews, Whither the NBA, Whither America?, PEACE REVIEW 505, 505 (1999).





197 See JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 144 ("The Role of Article 81(3)").
198 See infra notes 239-241 and accompanying text; supra Part II.A.
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protecting minors, all of the potential NBA and NFL entrants that have thus
far been excluded by the leagues' age/education rules have been high
school graduates over age eighteen.' 
99
2. Applying the European Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
Presuming that a plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case under
Article 81, the NBA and NFL further are unlikely to be able to defend their
age/education requirements under the EC's version of the non-statutory
labor exemption. 200 As explained by the Albany and Van der Woude cases,
the EC test for applying the non-statutory labor exemption requires a
defendant to show the following four factors: (1) a collective agreement
between management and labor; (2) conducted in good faith; (3) on core
subjects of collective bargaining; (4) that do not directly affect third
markets and third parties.
201
Both the NBA and NFL age/education requirements clearly meet the
"collective agreement" prong of the Albany/Van der Woude test, as both
age/education requirements are written into their respective collective
bargaining agreements, signed between management and labor.202 The
NBA age/education requirement appears as Article 10, Section 1 (b) of the
collective bargaining agreement, signed by the NBA teams and the National
Basketball Players Association (NBPA).2 °3  Meanwhile, the NFL
age/education requirement appears as Article 16, Section 2(b) of the
collective bargaining agreement, signed by the NFL teams and the National
Football League Players Association (NFLPA).2 °4
The NBA and NFL age/education requirements also meet the "good
faith" prong of the Albany/Van der Woude test. Although relevant case law
does not explicitly define "good faith" in the context of the European
exemption, the term is most often held to mean "[a] state of mind consisting
in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2) faithfulness to one's duty or
obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to
seek unconscionable advantage. 20 5 In this context, it seems the "good
199 See Ian Thomson, Older but Not Wiser, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 10, 2003 at 76;
see also Phil Taylor & Mark Bechtel, Wait Class, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 1, 2004, at 22.
200 See infa Part IV.B. 1.
20" Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, para.
296; Case C-22/98.
202 See Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751,
para. 296.
203 NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 16, at Art. 10 § l(b)(i).
204 NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 17, at Art. 16, § 2(b).
205 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, para.
296.
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faith" requirement in the Albany!Van der Woude test is identical to the
"bona fide arm's length bargaining" prong of the Mackey Test. 20 6 Again,
there is little reason to believe either party lacked sufficient bargaining
207power to allow for a fair opportunity to obtain a quid pro quo.
The NBA and NFL age/requirements also most likely meet the third
prong of the European non-statutory labor exemption test, as related to
"core subjects of collective bargaining. 20 8 The ECJ has never addressed
the issue of what beyond "wages and working conditions" qualify as "core
subjects of bargaining. 2 9 However, this language again seems to come
almost directly from the Mackey Test's "mandatory subject of bargaining"
language.21 ° If anything, a "core subject of bargaining" is even broader
than a "mandatory subject. 2 1  Therefore, initial entry restrictions such as
age/education requirements are more likely than not covered by the
exemption.
Nonetheless, the NBA and NFL age/education requirements fail to
meet the final prong of the Albany/Van der Woude test. This is because the
age/education requirements seem to "directly affect third parties.'
2 12
Although there is minimal case law defining what constitutes "directly
affect[ing] third parties," this language seems at absolute broadest to shield
the same exact conduct as insulated by the Mackey Test's prong that
requires the questioned agreement to "primarily affect the parties
involved., 21 3 More likely, however, the Albany/Van der Woude test, by its
clear wording, is even narrower. Here, "third parties" seems to include
players that are not yet eligible for union membership, who are seeking to
enter either the NBA or NFL drafts. These players are considered "third
parties" because they are not represented by the clubs' liaisons to collective
bargaining, and they are ineligible for representation by the union.
IV. LEGALITY OF NFL AND NBA DRAFTS AND RESERVE
SYSTEMS
The legal status of league drafts and reserve systems also might be
216 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
207 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27.
208 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, para.
296.
209 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, para.
296.
210 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
211 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751, para.
296.
212 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-575 1, para.
296.
213 Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-575 1, para.
296.
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more favorable to professional sports leagues under U.S. law than under EC
law. In the United States, both the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve
systems are legal-insulated from liability under Section 1 of the Sherman
214Act by the non-statutory labor exemption. However, in Europe, even if
the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve systems are insulated from liability
under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, these drafts and reserve systems still
might violate Article 39 of the EC Treaty, which pertains to the rights to
free movement of workers throughout the European Community.2 15
A. Analysis Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
1. Prima Facie Case ofAntitrust Violation
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, both the NBA and NFL's
unilaterally-implemented league drafts and reserve systems present a prima
facie case of an antitrust violation; however, both sets of rules are probably
exempt from antitrust liability under the non-statutory labor exemption.216
The issue of whether league drafts present a prima facie case on an antitrust
violation was first tested by former NFL defensive back James "Yazoo"
Smith in the case Smith v. NFL.2 7 In that case, Smith filed suit against the
NFL clubs, contending that the NFL draft constituted a "group boycott"
because the NFL clubs concertedly refused to deal with any player before
he has been drafted or after he has been drafted by another team.2 8 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, applying the Rule of
Reason, ruled in Smith's favor, finding that the draft was "undeniably
anticompetitive both in its purpose and in its effect."21 9 This was because
the NFL draft, as it existed in 1968 "inescapably force[d] each seller of
football services to deal with one, and only one buyer, robbing the seller, as




Similarly, league-wide reserve systems have also been found to
214 See infra Part IV.A.2.
215 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39.
216 See infra Part IV.A.2; see also McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1196-97 ("Thus, we conclude
that plaintiff has sufficiently established that [the NFL reserve system] as applied,
unreasonably restrains trade and commerce and is violative [sic] of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.").
217 593 F.2d 1173 (1978).
218 Id. at 1178.
219 Id. at 1185.
221 Id. at 1185. Although the court left open "the possibility that some type of player
selection system might be defended as serving to regulate and promote competition," the
court found that this particular draft, that applied to all players seeking to enter the league
"leaves no room whatever for competition among the teams for the services of college
players, and utterly strips them of any measure of control over the marketing of their
talents." Id. at 1185, 1187.
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constitute prima facie violations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.221
For example, in the 1976 case Mackey v. NFL, several NFL players led by
Hall of Fame tight end John Mackey brought suit in the U.S. District Court
of Minnesota against each of the individual NFL clubs, 222 arguing that an
NFL bylaw known as the "Rozelle Rule" violated Section 1 of the Sherman
Act because it awarded the NFL commissioner power to compensate clubs
that lost free agent players and penalized clubs that signed them. 223  Both
the District Court of Minnesota and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit agreed with Mackey, finding that the Rozelle Rule, when
unilaterally implemented, violated Section 1.224 Although the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's finding that
these restraints were illegal per se,225 both courts agreed with the district
court's alternate conclusion that under the Rule of Reason the anti-
221 See infra Part IV.A.2; see also McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1196-97; Mackey, 543 F.2d at
618-19.
222 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609, n.2; see also Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 407 F.
Supp. 1000, 1002 (D. Minn. 1975) (rev'd in part by Mackey, 543 F.2d 606) (stating names of
plaintiffs).
223 Mackey, 407 F. Supp. 1000. The court explained:
Plaintiffs claim that Section 12.1(H) of the NFL Constitution and By-Laws
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Rozelle Rule') constitutes a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. Plaintiffs claim that if the Rozelle Rule does not constitute a per se
violation of the antitrust laws, it violates the Rule of Reason standard. Plaintiffs
further claim that they are entitled to damages and injunctive relief.
Id. at 1002. See also WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 83, at 206 (the Rozelle Rule was "the
NFL's practice of requiring the team that signed a veteran free agent to provide what the
commissioner judged to be 'fair and equitable' compensation (by way of players, draft
choices, or both) to the team that had lost the player off its roster.").
224 See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618-19 (finding the per se test inappropriate in the context of
the NFL's Rozelle Rule, but still finding the prima facie test met based on the Rule of
Reason); Mackey, 407 F. Supp. at 1007-08 (finding the prima facie test is met both based on
the per se standard and the Rule of Reason).
225 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619. The court went on to explain:
Here, however, as the owners and Commissioner urge, the NFL assumes some of
the characteristics of a joint venture in that each member club has a stake in the
success of the other teams. No one club is interested in driving another team out
of business, since if the League fails, no one team can survive. Although
businessmen cannot wholly evade the antitrust laws by characterizing their
operation as a joint venture, we conclude that the unique nature of the business of
professional football renders it inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality
rules here, fashioned in a different context.
Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Nat'l Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa 1953);
Timken Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951)).
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competitive effects of the Rozelle Rule outweighed the rule's pro-
competitive benefits. 226
Additionally, in the case McCourt v. Cal. Sports Inc., 227 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff hockey player Dale
McCourt "sufficiently established that [the NHL reserve system], as
applied, unreasonably restrain[ed] trade and commerce" in a manner that
led to a prima facie showing of an antitrust violation.228 Although the NHL
ultimately escaped liability in McCourt based on the non-statutory labor
exemption, the prima facie cases in Mackey and McCourt were similar.229
2. Analysis Under the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The NBA and NFL's drafts and reserve systems are probably exempt
from antitrust liability under the non-statutory labor exemption, regardless
of whether a court applies the Clarett Test or the Mackey Test. Applying
the Clarett Test, league drafts and reserve systems are mandatory subjects
of bargaining because "they have tangible effects on the wages and working
conditions of current NFL players." In addition, courts would "subvert
fundamental principles of our federal labor policy" were they to fail to
insulate league drafts and reserve systems from antitrust review; league
drafts and reserve systems are the kind of issues over which one might
expect an employer and union to bargain in the professional sports
collective bargaining context.23 1
The drafts and reserve systems implemented by the NBA and NFL
also very likely meet the three-prong test established in Mackey because
226 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619 (explaining that the Rozelle Rule was anti-competitive for
the following reasons: (1) the Rozelle Rule significantly deters clubs from negotiating with
and signing free agents; (2) it acts as a substantial deterrent to players playing out their
options and becoming free agents; (3) it significantly decreases players' bargaining power in
contract negotiations; that players are thus denied the right to sell their services in a free and
open market; (4) that, as a result, the salaries paid by each club are lower than if competitive
bidding were allowed to prevail; and (5) that absent the Rozelle Rule, there would be
increased movement in interstate commerce of players from one club to another).
227 600 F.2d 1193.
228 Id. at 1196-97.
229 Compare Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616-18 (stating that the Rozelle Rule "imposes
significant restrictions on players, and its form has remained unchanged since it was
unilaterally promulgated by the clubs in 1963. The provisions.., do not in and of
themselves inure to the benefit of the players or their union."), with McCourt, 600 F.2d at
1197, 1203 (stating that the reserve system "inhibits and deters teams from signing free
agents, decreases a player's bargaining power in negotiations, denies players the right to sell
their services in a free and open market, and it depresses salaries more than if competitive
bidding were allowed.").
230 Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
231 Id. at 138 (citing Wood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d, 954, 956-58 (2d Cir.
2004)).
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they are (1) mandatory subjects of bargaining, (2) primarily affecting the
parties involved, and (3) reached at arms' length bargaining. 232 The league
drafts and reserve systems are mandatory subjects of bargaining because
each "operates to restrict a player's ability to move from one team to
another and [each] depresses player salaries. 233 Both also primarily affect
the parties involved because both relate primarily to the status of teams and
players. 234  Finally, both were reached through bona fide arm's-length
bargaining, given that the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve systems are
written directly into the collective bargaining agreement as the result of real
negotiations between the league and the players association.235
B. Analysis Under the EC Treaty
Applying Article 81 of the EC Treaty, the NBA and NFL drafts and
reserve systems also are likely insulated from liability. However, these
drafts and reserve systems might separately violate Article 39 of the Treaty.
1. Article 81 Analysis of League Drafts and Reserve Systems
The NBA and NFL drafts and reserve systems are likely insulated
from liability under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. With respect to the EC
version of the prima facie test, the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve
systems seem to fall within the scope of Article 81 (1) because both "limit or
control production [and] markets" for labor inputs. 236 In addition, neither
qualifies for the de minimus exception because both the NBA and NFL
control more than five percent of the relevant labor market.2 37 Moreover,
neither the NBA or NFL drafts nor the reserve systems likely qualify as
"necessary to make that competition possible in the first place." 38
With respect to Article 81(3), it is difficult to tell whether the
Commission would exempt the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve systems
based on the kind of social policy grounds that are irrelevant under U.S.
232 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
233 Id. at 615. See also McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1198 (stating that federal labor policy is
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement sought to be exempted concerns
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining or is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining).
234 See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1198 ("Clearly here the restraint on trade primarily affects
the parties to the bargaining relationship. It is the hockey players themselves who are
primarily affected by any restraint, reasonable or not."); Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405.
235 See McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1199-203; Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616; Zimmerman, 632 F.
Supp. at 406-08; see also Edelman & Harrison, supra note 59, at 23.
236 EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 81(1)(a).
237 See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Effect of Trade Concept Contained in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101/81) para. 46.
238 Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4921, para. 265. See also Pitts, supra note 190, at 435;
Shaffer, supra note 190, at 684.
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antitrust law but sometimes make their way into EC competition law
analysis.239 It is possible, albeit unlikely, that the Commission would
exempt U.S.-style sports leagues' drafts and reserve systems on social
policy grounds because they play an important role in the sports' structure
and existence. 240 Nonetheless, the drafts and reserve systems do not benefit
consumers in an economic sense because consumers do not enjoy their "fair
share of the resulting benefit" from league drafts and reserve systems.241
Nonetheless, all this debate is relatively moot given that both the NBA
and NFL drafts and reserve systems are likely insulated from Article 81
liability by the European version of the non-statutory labor exemption.
This is because both the NBA and NFL reserve systems emerge from
collective agreements between management and labor conducted in good
faith on core subjects of collective bargaining, and do not directly affect
third markets and third parties. 242 The only real question with respect to
applying the EC non-statutory labor exemption is whether recently drafted
players constitute "third parties" under the Albany/Van der Woude test.
Although these players, once drafted, become subject to union membership,
they are unable to technically join the union prior to the draft.243 While this
remains an issue of first impression for EC courts, there is a strong
argument that players eligible for the NBA or NFL drafts are not "third
parties" because these players are eligible for league entry and will gain
union membership upon being selected by a club.24
2. Article 39 Analysis of League Drafts and Reserve Systems
Article 39 of the EC Treaty, however, presents an alternate route by
which the ECJ might find NBA and NFL clubs liable for imposing drafts
and reserve systems, at least with respect to their implication on citizens of
EC Member States. 45 Under Article 39, the main problem with the NBA
239 Compare JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 8, at 144 (mentioning that social policy is a
factor that the Commission might consider in granting an Article 81(3) exemption), with
Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs 435 U.S. at 688 ("Contrary to its name, the Rule does not open
the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall
within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact
on competitive conditions.").
240 Pons, supra note 111, at 6.
241 EC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 81(3).
242 See Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751,
para. 296.
243 See Van der Woude, 2000 E.C.R. 1-7111, paras. 22-27; Albany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-5751,
para. 296.
244 See generally Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405 (finding that players preparing to enter
league draft were adequately protected under Mackey's "primarily affects the parties
involved" prong).
245 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, at Art. 39.
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and NFL drafts and reserve systems is that both seem to limit the "free
movement of workers. 24 6 As explained by the ECJ in Walrave, it makes
no difference that the league drafts and reserve systems do not discriminate
on the basis of nationality. 247  Both still inhibit fluid, free markets
transacting across Member States' boundaries, which is a major concern of
EC competition policy.
248
The fact that the NBA and NFL drafts and reserve systems are
collectively bargained is irrelevant to an Article 39 claim because the EC's
non-statutory labor exemption does not apply with respect to Article 39
claims.249 In fact, the ECJ recently held that:
[T]he fact that an agreement or activity is excluded from the scope of
the competition rules does not necessarily mean that it is also
excluded from the scope of freedom of movement rules. On the
contrary, an agreement or activity may fall under one set of rules
while simultaneously being excluded from the other. 250
CONCLUSION
Expanding U.S. professional sports leagues into Europe is an exciting
opportunity for both club owners and fans; however, expanding into Europe
also exposes U.S. sports leagues to potential new sources of liability. These
new sources of liability emerge primarily under Articles 81 and 39 of the
EC Treaty.
Because U.S. professional sports leagues are structured differently
from their European counterparts, the ECJ has never needed to determine
whether league-wide age/education requirements, or league drafts and
reserve systems, would violate the EC Treaty. Upon preliminary review,
however, it seems that the NBA and NFL age/education requirements likely
violate Article 81 of the Treaty, while the NBA and the NFL drafts and
reserve systems might violate Article 39 (at least with respect to European
nationals).
These conclusions do not mean that expanding the NBA and NFL into
Europe would be impossible. However, both leagues would need to make
some modifications to their league rules to minimize their risk of liability.
246 Id. at art. 39(1). See also id. at art. 39(2)-(3).
247 Walrave, 1974 ECR 1405, para. 4 ("Having regard to the objectives of the
Community, the practice of sport is subject to Community law only in so far as it constitutes
an economic activity within the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty."). See also PARRISH,
supra note 12, at 86-88; SZYMANSKI & ZIMBALIST, supra note 9, at 114.
248 See EC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 39.
249 See PARRISH AND MIETTINEN, supra note 12 at 69-70 (citing Case C-519/04, David
Meca-Medina & Igor Majcen v. Comm'n 2006 ECR 1-4929 at para. 31-33).
250 Int'l Transp. 2007 ECR 1-10779, para. 26.
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With respect to their age/education requirements, the easiest solution for
both the NBA and NFL would be to drop these requirements altogether.
Not only do age/education requirements present a likely source of liability
under the EC Treaty, but even in the United States, the legality of
age/education requirements remains questionable under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
Meanwhile, with respect to their league drafts and reserve systems, the
NBA and NFL probably should reach out to the European Commission and
seek a consent agreement, protecting both systems. Ultimately, the NBA
and NFL may need to change their draft and reserve rules slightly to
provide European nationals with certain special exemptions. However,
because most NBA and NFL players are not from Europe, any required
changes to either league's rules would likely have a minimal impact on the
league's overall business structure.
